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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WEST VALLEY CITY,
Appellee/Plaintiff,
vs.

j
|
]

TRIAL COURT CASE NO. 941000493

i CASE NO. 940507-CA

LYNN POULSEN,
Appellant/Defendant

I PRIORITY 2
]

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED POULSEN'S MOTION
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE CITY'S
CASE-IN-CHIEF.
a. Poulsen's Motion to Dismiss should have been granted
by the trial court as there was not a prima facia case to submit
to the jury.
The applicable standard of review is under the abuse of
discretion standard for legal determinations or clearly erroneous
1

for factual determinations. State v. 01senf 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah
1993); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 n. 5 (Utah 1994); State
v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez. 817
P.2d 774, 781-82 n. 3 (Utah 1991); State v. Russell. 791 P.2d 188,
192-93 (Utah 1990); Kunzler v. O'Dell. 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Ut. App.
1993) .
II
WHETHER

THE

WEST

VALLEY

CITY

ORDINANCE

IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO FACTS AND THE LAW IN POULSEN'S CASE.
a.

Whether the language is so overbroad it prohibits

lawful as well as unlawful conduct.
The standard of review is for correctness and presents
a question of law under a correction of error standard. State v.
James. 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991); Provo Citv v. Wilden. 768
P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989); West Valley City v. Streeter. 849 P.2d
613, 614 (Ut. App. 1993); City of Monticello v. Christensen. 788
P.2d 513, 516 (Utah).
Ill
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED POULSEN'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL IN LIGHT OF THE PREJUDICIAL REMARKS MADE BY THE
CITY'S PROSECUTOR THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL AND REFERENCE TO MATTERS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION.
a.

Whether the jury instructions combined with the

prosecutor and the courts misstatement of the law of strict
2

liability denied Poulsen a fundamentally fair trial.
The standard of review is abuse of discretion as to legal
conclusions and the rulings on admissibility of evidence as a
question of law reviewed for correctness with a clearly erroneous
standard for subsidiary factual findings. State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d
1377, 1380 (Ut. App. 1993); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah
1994); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991); State v.
Hay, 859 P.2d 1,6 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTION, STATUTORY AND RULE CONSTRUCTION
THOUGHT TO BE DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES
Utah State Const.. Art. I, Sec. 7
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(2)(4)(7)
Utah Rules of Criminal Proc.. Rule 23
Utah Rules of Criminal Proc., Rule 24
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404
West Valley City Ordinance, § 23-5-105
STATEMENT OF CASE
On February 15, 1994, Poulsen was charged with 6 counts
of Animals At Large, West Valley City Ordinance § 23-5-105 and 6
counts of Nuisance Animals, West Valley City Ordinance § 23-5-101.

3

(R.26,27)
During the course of the pretrial proceedings Poulsen
filed several challenges to the constitutionality of ordinance
(R.70,85) and claims of double jeopardy.

(R.89) All Poulsen!s

motions were summarily disposed by the trial court on June 23,
1994, at pretrial conference.
On July 5, 1994, prior to a jury being empaneled, Poulsen
renewed her Motion to Dismiss on claims of double jeopardy, and
constitutionality of the ordinance as applied. Six of the counts
of Nuisance Animals were dismissed by the court on these grounds
and Poulsen was tried on the remaining 6 counts of Animals at
Large.
After the city rested its case-in-chief, Poulsen moved
the court for a directed verdict of dismissal based on the grounds
the

city

had

"responsibility"

failed
to

the

Poulsen's motion based

to

prove

animals.

an

essential

(T.78-89)

on only part

The

element
court

of

denied

of the elements of the

ordinance that charged a person with "care, custody, or control of
Animals at Large". (T.90)
The case was submitted to the jury and after deliberation
returned with 4 verdicts of guilty and 2 acquittals. (R. 157-168)
Poulsen timely filed a Motion for Arrest of Judgment (R. 180-192)
and a Motion for a New Trial. (R.214-219, 238-241, 259-275) An
order denying Poulsen1s motions was entered on August 22, 1994.
4

(R.276, 314-316) Poulsen filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial
court on August 30, 1994.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
West Valley City officers were dispatched by Salt Lake
County deputies to help contain 6-8 horses running at large between
the boundaries of West Valley City and Magna area on February 15,
1994, at 1;30 A.M. (T.16) The horses bolted and ran North down 7200
West to 2100 South freeway where they turned West and went into
some tall grass where the officers lost sight of them. (T.19, 2223, 28)
Poulsen and her daughter spotted the loose horses and
opened a gate to a pasture on 2100 South and approximately 7700
West, where the officers assisted Poulsen in containing the horses.
After the horses were contained, Salt Lake County deputies departed
and only the West Valley City officers remained. (T.24-26, 29, 33,
38-39)
West Valley City officer Stan Larsen (Larsen) approached
Poulsen after she had closed the gate and asked her if she was the
owner of the horses. Poulsen stated that she was not the owner of
the horses but did know the owner of the horses. Larsen then told
Poulsen by closing the gate she "assumed charge, care, custody, and
control of the horses". He also told her that the animals should
be impounded.

(T.42-43) However, Larsen tacitly consented for

Poulsen to keep the horses there the night.
5

Poulsenfs daughter, age approximately 20, was also on the
scene, and while the officers were talking to Poulsen, the daughter
hopped on one of the horses (not one identified by the officers as
loose) and rode it to the back of the field. Poulsen's daughter
also took a bag of feed out of her car and fed the horses. (T.4345)
Poulsen told the officers that the horses could stay in
the area for the night (T.105) because it was snowing (T.53) and
she didn't believe the officers could catch the animals without an
incident. (T.105) Poulsen also expressed concern that one of the
officers might be hurt by trying to catch the blind horse or the
one that kicked. (T.71-72) So the officers authorized Poulsen to
keep the animals for the night. (T.106-107)
Larsen then told Poulsen he was going to issue her a
citation for the animals being loose and asked Poulsen for her
name,

address,

and

phone

number

which

Poulsen

gave

him.

(T.50,97,103)
Larsen then asked Poulsen for some identification which
she looked through her purse for a while but was unable to locate
her

identification

cards.

(T.49)

However,

officer

Presbrey

eventually went through Poulsen! s purse and did find identification
cards with Poulsenfs name on them. (T.100-101)
Larsen then asked Poulsen to produce a drivers license.
(T.49) When Poulsen couldn't produce a drivers license, Larsen
6

asked Poulsen for her date of birth which Poulsen refused to give
Larsen, stating it was against her religious belief to use a birth
date. (T.51)
Poulsen was then arrested for failing to identify herself
and taken to Salt Lake County jail. (T.113,139-140)
Poulsen was charged with 6 counts of Animals at Large
under West Valley City Ordinance § 23-5-105 and 6 counts of
Nuisance Animals under West Valley City Ordinance § 23-5-101.
(R.26-27) Numerous motions to dismiss on various grounds were heard
and denied by the trial court on June 23, 1994.
On July 5, 1994, prior to the empaneling the jury,
Poulsen renewed her motions to dismiss on unconstitutionality of
ordinance, double jeopardy, and jurisdiction. The trial court
dismissed the 6 counts of Animal Nuisance charges on these grounds.
After the jury was empaneled the city improperly stated to the jury
in opening statement that Poulsen was the owner of the animals.
(T.7)
During the city's Officer Coxs' testimonmy and the only
one who saw the horses in West Valley City, he testified he did not
know who the owner of the horses was, as he'd left that up to the
animal control officers. (T.28-29)
Larsen testified that he only "assumed" Poulsen was the
owner because she was there that night but had no knowledge of who
the actual owner of the horses was (T.64) and stated it was not his
7

job to find out who owned the horses as they were "county animals11.
(T.65)1
The city brought up the issue of Poulsen's drivers
license status and Poulsen objected to the relevancy which was
overruled by the court (T.46).
Again the city brought up that Poulsen didn't have a
drivers license and Poulsen objected

as no vehicle

stop was

involved. The city stated that it went to Poulsen's ability to tell
the truth. (T.50) However, Poulsen never placed her character into
issue.
After the city presented their case-in-chief, Poulsen
moved for dismissal for the city's failure to prove the essential
element of "allow" and "responsibility" to the horses and for the
city's prejudicial remarks about Poulsen's drivers license status.
(T.78-88)
Further, the city never did dispute that the horses were
owned by a Mr. Rokich and the only facts the city had proven were
as follows: (1) West Valley City Officers chased down some horses
(2) the offense had occurred in West Valley City (3) the horses
arrived at a pasture with a gate on it (4) the defendant and her
daughter are at the pasture

(5) defendant repairs a gate (6)

In a jurisdictional hearing and also throughout discovery
Poulsen had requested to see the contractual agreement between the
city and the county for animal control as provided for in U.C.A.
§ 4-25-2 (1982).
8

daughter has a bag of food in her car (7) daughter rides one of the
horses (not identified as one that was loose) (8) defendant knows
one horse kicks and one horse is blind. (T.85-86)
The trial court denied Poulsenfs Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that no legal duty needed to be proven, just "charge, care,
custody, and control". (T.90)
At closing arguments the city prosecutor made several
prejudicial comments concerning matter outside the elements of the
charges against Poulsen. (T.158,160,170-171) The city prosecutor
also stated several times that Poulsen had a burden to present
evidence against the city. Also that only the city's witnesses were
to be believed and not Poulsenfs witnesses. However, Poulsen's
witnesses had not been impeached by the city. (T.156,171-172)
The

city

also

misstated

the

law

regarding

strict

liability offenses and asked the trial court to also misinstruct
the jury with regard to strict liability offenses. (T.155,157,168169) The jury returned

4 counts of guilty

and

2 counts of

acquittal.
Poulsen filed two post trial motions prior to sentencing
for Arrest of Judgment and for a New Trial, both were denied by the
court on August 22, 1994. The court imposed a fine, surcharge,
restitution and probation and 30 days in jail against Poulsen.
Poulsen filed a Motion for a New Trial and to Vacate
sentence which was denied by the court.
9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
The trial court should have granted Poulsenfs motion for
dismissal at the close of the city's case in chief for the city's
failure to prove the essential element of "allowing" or being
"responsible" for the horses to run at large.
The trial court should have also granted Poulsen's motion
for Arrest of Judgment on the grounds that the facts so proven by
the city did not constitute a public offense.
POINT II
The language of the ordinance in the case at bar is
unconstitutional as applied to Poulsen. When the city stated they
did not need to prove that Poulsen had a legal relationship to the
horses, it shifted the burden of production to Poulsen to prove her
innocence. This is fundamentally unfair and denied Poulsen the
constitutional right to have the city prove all the elements
against her beyond reasonable doubt.
Also the conduct of one having "charge, care, custody or
control" of animals is overbroad and describes lawful as well as
unlawful conduct minus the element of legal duty. The language of
the ordinance is overbroad in describing the conduct prohibited
which is a protectable conduct of one who is entitled to have
charge, care, custody, or control of horses.

10

POINT III
The trial court improperly overruled Poulsen's objections
to the city's continuous references to Poulsen's driving license
status. Poulsen was not charged with giving false information to
an officer nor driving without a license and the remarks that
Poulsen "lied" about her drivers license were prejudicial in having
the jury consider matters outside the case. There is no logical
connection between not having a drivers license and having or not
having "charge, care, custody, or control" of horses at large. The
city's remarks concerning Poulsen's reluctance to admit or confess
to any possible criminal offenses was prejudicial wherein Poulsen
has a constitutional privilege to not incriminate herself.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED POULSEN'S MOTION
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE CITY'S
CASE-IN-CHIEF.
After West Valley City had presented its case-in-chief
Poulsen moved for dismissal or a directed verdict of acquittal for
the

city's

failure

to

prove

the

essential

element

of

"responsibility" or a legal duty owed by Poulsen to the animals.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 gives the following definitions used in
criminal cases:
(2)

"Actor"

means
11

a

person

whose

criminal responsibility is in issue
in a criminal action.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act
when there is a legal duty to act
and the actor is capable of acting"
(1989).
Animals at Large essentially means that the owner or
other person responsible omitted to containing their animals and
had a legal duty to do so. The city stated that they had proven
that the animals were out in West Valley City and that Poulsen
closed

a gate and by virtue of that single act was thereby

"assuming charge, care, custody, or control of the animals", (T.4243) void of any duty to keep the animals contained.
However, according to all the elements of the city's
ordinance Poulsen had to "allow" the horses to run at large.
"The use in the pleadings of the word "allow"
implied that the Defendant was sufficiently in
control, ownership, or possession of the [dog]
as to be chargeable with regulation of his
conduct.... The word is synonymous with
"permit".... When used in conjunction with a
statute charging a duty to the owner... to
regulate his activities, connotes a positive
duty, failure to perform which would violate
the ordinance. 1 ALR 4th 994[b].
The

meanings

of

words

like

"allow"

in

statutory

construction, are to be construed "under the common definition of
those terms." Hornsby v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop. 758 P.2d
929 (Utah App. 1988). This court stated that "allow" means to
sanction, permit, acknowledge, approve of" Id. at 935 [quoting

12

Santanello v. Cooper, 106 Ariz. 262, 475 P.2d 245 (1970)]. In
Santanello, the Arizona Supreme Court specified that:
H

The word HallowM means to approve of, to
sanction, to permit, to acknowledge. Webster's
3rd International, unabridged (1961). So
defined, HallowM requires some degree of
knowledge, either actual or constructive, on
the part of the dog owner that his dog is at
large;...". Id. at 250.
In Neztosie v. Mever, 883 P.2d 920

(Utah 1994) the

Supreme Court gave the following definition concerning the term
"keeper" of an animal and found the words "custody, management, and
control intrinsic to the following definition":
"...the exercise of a substantial number of
incidents of ownership by one who, though not
the owner assumes to act in his stead. • •
undertakes to manage, control or care for
it... as owners in general are accustomed to
do" (emphasis added)•
This means more than merely checking to see if [an
animal] has sufficient food and water for a time. See McEvoy v.
Brown, 150 N.E. 2d 652,656 (111. App. Ct. 1958). Poulsen only
offered to contain the horses for the night as it was dark, snowing
and for the safety of the officers. (T.72-73) There was no evidence
that Poulsen owed a legal duty to the animals nor was Poulsen the
legal cause of their being loose. Neither did Poulsen have prior
knowledge of the horses being at large, therefore she did not
"allow" them to "run at large" nor whould she sanction such an act.
Poulsen properly moved for dismissal after the city^

13

case-in-chief as to whether Poulsen was the legal cause of the
horses being loose which was a question of law and one for the
court to decide. Am. Jur. 57A 2d. § 446 p.428.
"When a Motion for a Directed Verdict is made
at the close of the states case, the court
should dismiss the charge if the state did not
establish a prima facia case against the
defendant by producing believable evidence of
all the elements of the crime charged.H State
v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) (emphasis
added)•
a. Poulsenvs Motion to Dismiss should have been granted
by the trial court as there was not a prima facia case to submit
to the jury.
"In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to
send case to [the] jury, [the] court uses same standard for [the]
claim of insufficient evidence to support jury verdict.11 State v.
Tavlor, 884 P.2d 1293-94 (Ut. App. 1994).
A Motion for Arrest of Judgment is proper when "the facts
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense...". Ut. R.
Cr. Procedure, Rule 23. The city never proved a prior legal duty
Poulsen owed to the loose horses. In fact, the city requested the
court to misstate the law with regard to strict liability offenses
stating that the city need not have to prove a legal duty. (T.168169) "A judgment may be arrested based on an insufficiency of the
evidence or facts as proved

in trial or as admitted by the

parties." State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Ut. App. 1991), aff'd,

14

852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).
In light of the cityfs admission that it did not need to
prove a [legal] duty, the trial court should have granted Poulsen's
Motion for an Arrest of Judgment as this was a necessary element
to prove a public offense had been committed.
POINT II
WHETHER

THE

WEST

VALLEY

CITY

ORDINANCE

IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO FACTS AND THE LAW IN POULSENfS CASE
Poulsen contends that West Valley City Ordinance as
applied to Poulsen shifted the burden of proving the animals were
not in her "charge, care, custody, or control11, thus destroying the
constitutional

protection

of the presumption

of

innocence as

provided for in Ut. Code Ann. § 76-1-501 as follows:
"(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each
element of the offense charged against
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In absence of such proof, the defendant
shall be acquitted.
(2) ...[Element[s] of the offense" mean[s]:
(a) T h e
conduct,
attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden
in the definition of the offense;"
(emphasis added).
The West Valley City Ordinance clearly states ... "or the
person charged with the responsibility". The city admitted they did
not talk to the owner of the horses nor even asked the owner if
Poulsen had a legal responsibility for the horses. (T.85) In fact

15

the city stated all it had to prove was that the incident happened
and Poulsen was there (T.155-157) The city's only reference to any
responsibility to the animals was when Poulsen told the officers
she would be responsible to see that the horses stayed contained
for the night (T.107,120). The horses were not "at large" at that
point, the city even admitted that they didn't know where the
horses had gotten loose from. (T.69)
a.

Whether the language is so overbroad it prohibits

lawful as well as unlawful conduct.
The ordinance as applied to Poulsen is a violation of the
due process clause of the Ut. St. Const. Art. I, Sec. 7, with the
ordinance being overbroad in its application to lawful conduct as
well as unlawful. The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
"Statutory overbreadth... is a substantive due
process question which addresses the issue of
whether "the statute in question is so broad
that it may not only prohibit unprotected
behavior
but
may
also
prohibit
constitutionally protected activity as well".
State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah
1987).
It is just as legal and lawful to have charge, care,
custody or control of horses as it would be unlawful conduct if a
person were liable for the animals and they escaped. "A criminal
statute is overbroad when it in a substantial way prohibits lawful
act as well as unlawful acts". State v. Haicr, 578 P.2d 837 (Utah
1978) .
16

The court

simply

ignored

the plain wording

of the

ordinance and found that the city only had to prove "charge, care,
custody, or control" of the animals in one specific isolated
context. The "[t]erm "run at large" in relation to domestic animals
does not normally mean that animal is found on property of neighbor
in an isolated instance...". Christo v. People, 19 N.Y. 2d 678
(N.Y. 1967) . The city's ordinance as applied in this way to Poulsen
has shifted an unreasonable burden upon Poulsen to prove a negative
in

a

criminal

action,

which

is

in

violation

of

Poulsen's

constitutional protections to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty.
POINT III
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED POULSENfS MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL IN LIGHT OF THE PREJUDICIAL REMARKS MADE BY THE
CITY'S PROSECUTOR THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL AND REFERENCE TO MATTERS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THE JURYfS CONSIDERATION.
During the course of the trial the city continuously made
references to Poulsen's drivers license status. These remarks were
objected to by Poulsen on the grounds of relevancy, and was
overruled by the court. (T.46,49-50,110-112) The city stated the
grounds for getting into Poulsen's drivers license status was
because it was Poulsen "who wanted to get into the arrest and what
occurred"

(T.46)

and

Poulsen's

"(T.49-50)
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"tendency

to

tell

the

truth

The rules pertaining to relevancy are expressly set forth
concerning matters of the accused character. "Evidence of a persons
character or trait of character is not admissible for the purpose
of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
except (1) ...offered by the accused...". UT. R. EVID. 404. Poulsen
did not ever place her truthfulness in issue at trial for the city
to have brought Poulsen's drivers license status to light.
"By offering witnesses as to his reputation as a truthful
person, defendant opens the door for the prosecution to impeach his
character witnesses. State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah 1981).
Poulsen

never

offered

any

witness

testimony

concerning

her

reputation to tell the truth. This remark played a significant part
in prejudicing the jurors against Poulsen and had nothing to do
with the charges.
In closing argument the city improperly asked the jury
to consider remarks about Poulsen1s refusal to produce a drivers
license, stating that Poulsen's reluctance to admit to not having
a

license

constituted

Poulsen

being

a

"deceptive

person",

(T.160,170) "playing games" with the police officers. (T.158) It
had been brought to the courts attention that these remarks were
improper.

(T.84,86) Further, if Poulsen was driving without a

license,

it

constitutional

could
right

be

a

criminal

act

not to volunteer

officers.
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and

any

Poulsen

admissions

had

a

to the

These remarks were clearly made for the sole purpose of
prejudicing the jury against Poulsen. The remarks of the city in
the case at bar and State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 782, 784-86 (Utah
1992) are analogous in that in Emmett, the prosecution suggested
to the jurors that Emmett was the type of person who "took
advantage of his own family member[s]ff

[referring to victim of

previous forgery] and that "he did it again"... clearly urged the
jury to view Emmett as a person who commits crime against his
family" and to use this characteristic as evidence that Emmett
sodomized his son" Id. at 785-86. In Poulsen's case, the city
continuously made references to Poulsen's reluctance to confess to
police officers that she didn't have a drivers license to prove she
had charge, care, custody, and control of animals that were loose.
"Generally, the test used for determining whether a prosecutors
statements are improper and constitute error is whether the remarks
"called to the jurors1 attention matters which they would not be
justified in considering in reaching a verdict." Improper remarks
require reversal when they are harmful. Id. at 785 [quoting. State
v.

Tillman,

750 P.2d

546,

555

(Utah

1987)].

"The test

for

determining an error's harmfulness is whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that absent the error a different result would have
occurred". Id. at 784. See, e.g. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 781, 789
(Utah 1991) . The Court in Emmett also held that "this determination
should be made on the basis of the record as a whole.
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In the instant case, the determination is best made by
viewing this error in conjunction with other errors which occurred
during

the

trial,

specifically,

instances

of

prosecutorial

misconduct." Id. at 784-85. This impropriety was objected to by
Poulsen throughout the trial and when she argued her Motion to
Dismiss after the cityfs case-in-chief. The trial court should have
been fully aware of its harmfulness as it was obvious that the
remarks were for no other purpose than to prejudice Poulsen from
having a fair trial. Rule 404(b) expressly state, "Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith". Given the blatant irrelevant comments of the prosecutor
in Poulsen's case it should have been obvious to the court that the
prosecutors remarks called to the jurors matters they were not
"justified in considering" Emmett at 786.
a*

Whether the jury instructions combined with the

prosecutor and the courts misstatement of the law of strict
liability denied Poulsen a fundamentally fair trial.
The trial court failed to give the jury the proper
elements

instruction concerning what the city had to prove against

Poulsen beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Addendum) (T.152) Instead,
the court gave a informational jury instruction which did not
clearly define the cityfs burden to prove all the elements against
Poulsen. (T.152) A trial courts failure to give accurate elements
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in a jury instruction will be reviewed for correctness. State v.
Jones, 823 P.2d 1059,1061 (Utah 1991). "Jury instructions to which
a party failed to object will not be reviewed absent manifest
injustice". State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Ut. App. 1994)
[quoting Ut. R. Cr. Proc. , Rule 19(c) and State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d
1201,1203 (Ut. App 1991)].
This court overturned the conviction in Jones for the
very same error Poulsen is presenting before the court now. Because
Poulsen brought the issue of the cityfs failure to carry its burden
to prove these elements before the court at her Motion to Dismiss
and in her closing arguments, the court improperly instructed the
jury with regard to strict liability offenses and requires reversal
for manifest injustice.
Had the proper instruction been given to the jury, then
the wording in the ordinance of "allow" and "responsibility" would
have made it clear to the jury that the city did indeed need to
prove that Poulsen had a legal duty to keep the horses from
escaping.

Further,

the very

use

of the wording

"allow" and

responsible" as used in the ordinance negates any intention to
create strict liability for violation of the ordinance. Santanello,
at 252.
However,

even

though

Poulsen

pointed

this

scienter

requirement out to the court several times, and moved to dismiss
the charges, the court ignored the wording of the ordinance and
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allowed the city prosecutor to misstate the law of strict liability
to the jury. (T.169) "Whether proceeding under a strict liability
or negligence theory, proximate cause is a necessary element of the
Plaintiff's case". Am. Jur. 57A 2d. § 442 p.424).
"[P]roximate cause is not an affirmative defense to be
specially plead; it is a requirement of the Plaintiff's cause of
action and is put at issue by a general denial". Am. Jur. 57A 2d.
§ 439 p.422.
CONCUJSION
Poulsen respectfully requests that the Appellate court
reverse the convictions and judgment against Poulsen and either
vacate judgment or reverse for a new trial since the city did not
prove the element of "allow" and "responsible" in the city's case.
It is for this reason that the trial court plainly erred in not
granting Poulsen a new trial on the city's charges. The ordinance
was unconstitutionally applied to Poulsen. Poulsen contends that
manifest injustice is what the prosecutors comments cumulatively
misled

the

jury

to

believe.

The

cumulative

effect

of

the

prosecutors prejudicial comments and misstating the elements of the
ordinance and irrelevant comments caused manifest injustice and
requires this court to reverse and dismiss the charges against
Poulsen.
Respectfully submitted,
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LYNN POULSEN, APPELLANT/DEFENDANT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I Lynn Poulsen, certify that on June 10, 1996, I served
two copies of the attached Appellant's Brief upon Richard Catten,
the counsel for the Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to him
by

first

class mail

with

sufficient

postage

prepaid

following address:
3636 Constitution Blvd., West Valley City, Utah 84119.
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to the

ADDENDUM
Utah State Const., Art. I Sec. 7.
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law. H
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401.
"Single criminal episode11 defined
Joinder of offenses and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a
different
definition,
"single
criminal
episode19 means all conduct which is closely
related in time and is incident to an attempt
or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed
to limit or modify the effect of Section 7721-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses
and
defendants
in
criminal
proceedings"
(1975).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402.
"Separate offenses arising out of singe
criminal episode - Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal actio for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall
establish offenses which may be punished
in
different
way
under
different
provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision;
an acquittal or conviction and sentence
under
any
such
provision
bars
a
prosecution
under
any
other
such
provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate
offenses under a single criminal episode,
unless the court otherwise orders to
promote justice, a defendant shall not be
subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:
(a) the
offenses
are
within
the
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jurisdiction of a single court# and
The offenses are known to the
prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged
but may not be convicted of both the
offense charged and the included offense.
An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission
of the offense charged; or
(b) It
constitutes
an
attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense
charged or an offense otherwise
included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a
statute
as
a
lesser
included
offense.
The court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a
rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense.
If the district court on motion after
verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall
determine that there is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for the
offense
charged but
that
there
is
sufficient
evidence
to
support
a
conviction for an included offense and
the trier of fact necessarily found every
fact required for conviction of that
included offense, the verdict or judgment
of conviction may be set aside or
reversed and a judgment of conviction
entered for the included offense, without
necessity of a new trial, if such relief
is sought by the defendant (1974)•
(b)
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Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-501.
Presumption of innocence - "Element of the
offense" defined.
N
(l) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each
element of the offense charged against
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In absence of such proof, the defendant
shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element
of the offense" mean:
(a) T h e
conduct,
attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden
in the definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue
are not preponderance of the evidence
(1973).
Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-601(2)(4) (7) .
Definitions.
"Unless otherwise provided, the following
terms apply to this title:
(2) "Actor" means
a person
whose
criminal responsibility is in issue
in a criminal action.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act
when there is a legal duty to act
and the actor is capable of acting"
(1989).
Utah Rules of Criminal Proc., Rule 23.
"At any time prior to the imposition of
sentence, the Court upon its own initiative
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall
arrest judgment if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense or
the defendant is mentally ill, or there is
other good cause for the arrest of judgment.".
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Utah Rules of Criminal P r o c , Rule 24.
Motion for new trial.
"(a) The court may, upon motion of a
party or upon its own initiative,
grant a new trial in the interest of
justice if there is any error or
impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of a
party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be
made in writing and upon notice. The
motion shall be accompanied
by
affidavits
or
evidence
of
the
essential facts in support of the
motion.
If
additional
time
is
required to procure affidavits or
evidence the court may postpone the
hearing on the motion for such time
as it deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be
made within 10 days after imposition
of sentence, or within such further
time as the court may fix during the
ten-day period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party
shall be in the same position as if
no trial had been held and the
former verdict shall not be used or
mentioned either in evidence or in
argument.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401.
"Definition of "relevant evidence"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence".
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 402.
"Relevant
evidence
generally
admissible;
irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible,
except
as
otherwise
provided
by
the
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constitution of the Unites States or the
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or
by these rules, or by other rules applicable
in courts of this state. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible".
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403.
"Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although
relevant,
evidence
may
be
excluded
if
its
probative
value
is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence".
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404.
"Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of
a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving actin in conformity
therewith on a particular
occasion,
except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a
pertinent trait of character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution
to rebut the same;
(2) character of victim. Evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a
character trait of peacefulness of
the
victim
offered
by
the
prosecution in a homicide case to
rebut evidence that the victim was
the first aggressor;
(3) character of witness. Evidence of
the character of a witness, as
provided in rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
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admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident"
(Amended effective October 1, 1992) .
West Valley City Ordinance, § 23-5-105.
"It shall be unlawful for the owner or person
having charge, care, custody or control of any
animal to allow such animal at any time to run
at large. The owner or person charged with
responsibility for an animal found running at
large shall be strictly liable for a violation
of this section regardless of the precautions
taken to prevent the escape of the animal and
regardless of whether or not he knows that the
animal is running at large."
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF WEST VALLEY CITY
VS
POULSEN, LYNN
3660 S 7236 W
MAGNA

UT

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)
CASE NO:
DOB:
TAPE:
DATE:
CITATION:

84044

941000493
05/17/53
COUNT:
08/03/94
,

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 23-3-105 DOG AT LARGE
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty - Jury
Fine:
500.00
Susp:
250.00
Jail: 3 0 DA
Susp: 30 DA
COMMUNITY SERVICE IN LIEU OF FINE.

ACS:

50 HR

Charge: 23-5-101 NUIS ANIMAL
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

0

Charge: 23-3-105 DOG AT LARGE
Plea:
Find: Guilty - Jury
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

0

Charge: 23-3-105 DOG AT LARGE
Plea:
Find: Guilty - Jury
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

0

Charge: 23-3-105 DOG AT LARGE
Plea:
Find: Guilty - Jury
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

0

Charge: 23-3-105 DOG AT LARGE
Plea:
Find: Not Guilty - Jury
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

0

ACS:

0

Charge: 23-3-105 DOG AT LARGE
Plea:
Find: Not Guilty - Jury
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
.Tail*

O

55usn:

0

POULSEN, LYNN

CASE NO: 941000493

Charge: 23-5-101 NUIS ANIMAL
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 23-5-101 NUIS ANIMAL
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 23-5-101 NUIS ANIMAL
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 23-5-101 NUIS ANIMAL
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

Charge: 23-5-101 NUIS ANIMAL
Plea:
Find: Dismissed
Fine:
0.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0

ACS:

FEES AND ASSESSMENTS:
Trust Category: Restitution
Paid:
0.00 Due:
Name: WEST VALLEY CITY
Address: 3 600 CONSTITUTION BLVD
Address: POLICE CASE #94-832 & 94-6941
City/State/Z ip:
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85%
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS:
Credit:
0.00 Paid:

PAGE

500.00

0.00

Due:

135.14

0.00

Due:

114.86

0.00

Due:

750.00

PROBATION TERMS & CONDITIONS:
12 MO PROB W/COURT TERMS: 1. NO OTHER VIOLATIONS 2. TIMELY
PAYMENT OF RESTITUTION BY 6/3/95 3. HORSE PROPERTY TO BE
PROPERLY FENCED OR NO HORSES PRESENT 4. VERIFICATION OF
COMPLETION OF COMMUNITY SERVICE WITH CHARITY OF CHOICE BY
2/3/95

CASE NO: 941000493

POULSEN, LYNN

PAGE

3

CALENDAR:
SENTENCING
08/03/94 02:00 PM in rm 3 with WILLIAM B BOHLING
DOCKET INFORMATION:
Chrg: DOG AT LARGE
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju
Fine Amount:
500.00
Suspended:
250.00
Jail:
30 DAYS
Suspended: 30 DAYS
Community Service:
50 HOURS in lieu of fine.
CREATE Trust A/R # 01 Restitution
500.00
IT IS ADJUDGED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF FOUR COUNTS OF
ANIMAL AT LARGE, A CLASS "B" MISD, BASED UPON A GUILTY VERDICT
BY A JURY. JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED DATED THIS 3RD DAY OF
AUGUST 1994.

BY THE C 0 6 R X . ^ V . ^V. N V C «.%

NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT ENTERED

/Wni

./
"CIRCUIT CJ3UHw o y O S & Q f £ / 7
DATED ______

L> ^-

—^

THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

WEST VALLEY CITY,
PLAINTIFF

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTIONS TO VACATE JUDGMENT
AND SENTENCE AND FOR A NEW
TRIAL
CASE NO. 941000493

LYNN POULSEN,
DEFENDANT.

The court having considered the parties briefs and oral
arguments on these matters, and for the reasons set forth by
the court on the record on August 22, 1994, and good cause
appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE IS
DENIED;

2.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS DENIED.
Dated this 22nd day of August, 1994

• # * • • " « • * -

BY THB

^^mr****

INSTRUCTION NO .

It)

The Defendant is charged with the crimes in Counts 1-6, of
"ANIMAL RUNNING AT LARGE", in violation of Section 23-5-102, West
Valley city Ordinance, a Class "B" misdemeanor.
Before you find the Defendant guilty of the crime of Animal
Running at Large, you must find from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the following elements of that crime:

That on or about the 15th day of
February, 1994;
2. In West Valley City; — —
3. The Defendant, Lynn Poulsen; ^4. had charge, cars^-jsis^ody or control of
any animal andrallowec^such animal to
run at large; ^
—J

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of
the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your
duty to find the Defendant guilty.

On the other hand, if the

evidence has failed to so establish one or more of said elements,
then you should fine the Defendant not guilty.

